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R22We investigate (a) how patient choice of hospital for elective hip replacement is inﬂuenced by distance, quality
and waiting times, (b) differences in choices between patients in urban and rural locations, (c) the relationship
between hospitals' elasticities of demand to quality and the number of local rivals, and how these changed
after relaxation of constraints on hospital choice in England in 2006. Using a data set on over 500,000 elective
hip replacement patients over the period 2002 to 2013 we ﬁnd that patients became more likely to travel to a
provider with higher quality or lower waiting times, the proportion of patients bypassing their nearest provider
increased from 25% to almost 50%, and hospital elasticity of demand with respect to own quality increased.
By 2013 average hospital demand elasticity with respect to readmission rates and waiting times were −0.2
and−0.04. Providers facing more rivals had demand that was more elastic with respect to quality and waiting
times. Patients from rural areas have smaller disutility from distance.
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Rurality1. Introduction
Healthcare reforms extending the patient's right to choose a
provider for hospital care have been introduced in several OECD
countries during the last two decades (Vrangbaek et al., 2012). Reduc-
ing constraints on choice for planned (non-emergency) healthcare is
intended, inter alia, to incentivize hospitals to compete on quality
(Besley and Ghatak, 2003), especially in those systems where prices
for healthcare are regulated (Gaynor, 2006). It is hoped that with
fewer constraints on patient choice of provider, hospitals with higher
quality can attract more demand and raise revenues, whereas those
with poor quality may lose revenues. However, the success of this in-
centive mechanism depends crucially onwhether patients and demand
respond to hospital quality.
In the English National Health Service (NHS) before 2006 the choice
of hospitals for elective hospital treatmentwas generally constrained to
the set of local NHS hospitals which had contracts with the patient's
local health authority. In 2006 constraints on choice of provider were
relaxedwith patients having to be offered a choice of at least 4 providers
and from 2008 they could choose from any qualiﬁed providers
wherever located.celli).
. This is an open access article underUsing data from 2002/3 to 2012/13 on choice of hospital for elective
hip replacement we address three research questions related to
understanding demand-side mechanisms in healthcare: (a) how do
distance, quality and waiting times inﬂuence choice of hospital, (b) do
these factors have different effects on the choices of patients in rural
and urban areas, and (c) how does a hospital's elasticity of demand
with respect to its quality vary with the number of rivals. We use data
over a long period to investigate how the answers to these questions
changed over time, especially after the relaxation of constraints on
hospital choice in 2006.
These questions have obvious policy relevance. If hospital demand is
not responsive to quality then relaxation of constraints on choice is
unlikely to stimulate hospital competition via quality. Wider choice
sets may contain providers who yield higher utility to patients. But
this beneﬁt may be greater in urban areas where patients will have
more local providers, whereas rural patients with longer distances to
travel to providers may gain less and may change their demands less
in response to quality. If demand is more responsive to quality for
hospital with more rivals, quality may be higher in more competitive
areas and lower in less competitive ones.
We estimate models of hospital choice for elective hip replacement
and focus on two dimensions of quality: procedure speciﬁc clinical
quality and waiting times. The most common adverse outcome after
hip replacement surgery is an emergency readmission within 28 days.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 The English local purchasing authorities are Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) until April
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quality by rates of revisions within a year of discharge and mortality
rates within 28 days of discharge.
We ﬁnd that patients value quality when choosing their preferred
provider of care, especially after relaxation of constraints on choice.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that hospitals with higher readmission rates were
less likely to be chosen in the years after 2006, while this was not the
case in earlier years. Revision rates did not have a consistent effect on
choice. Hospitals with long waiting times attracted fewer patients, but
only after 2008, while hospitals with higher mortality rates were less
likely to be chosen throughout the entire period. As with previous
studies,we ﬁnddistance to be a strong predictor of choice, with patients
preferring hospitals close from home.
Marginal utilities for quality are similar for urban and rural patients
from2006 onwards.Marginal disutility of distance did not changemuch
over the period but was smaller for rural patients.
After the introduction of choice policies, the average demand elastic-
ity to readmission rates varied between−0.07 and−0.25. The average
demand elasticity towaiting timeswas about−0.04 after 2007. Patients
are willing to travel 0.5 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one
standard deviation in emergency readmissions. Hospital demand is
more elastic with respect to own quality the larger the number of rivals
and the effect of having more rivals became greater in later years.
Section 2 provides background by way of short review of the
relevant literature and a description of the institutional framework.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 sets out the methods and
Section 5 has the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background
2.1. Related literature
Our study contributes to the small but growing literature on hospital
choice andhow it relates to quality (see Brekke et al. (2014) for a review).
In the US, Luft et al. (1990) ﬁnd that hospitals with poorer than expected
mortality or complication rates attracted signiﬁcantly fewer admissions.
Similar results are obtained by Hodgkin (1996) and Tay (2003) using
health outcomes for patients with cardiac conditions, Howard (2005)
using graft failure rate one year following kidney transplantation, and
Pope (2009) using hospital quality rankings. Several studies have also in-
vestigated the effect of releasing hospital quality information on patient
choice and health outcomes. Wang et al. (2011) show that the publica-
tion of report cards decreased the probability of receiving CABG surgery
by poorly performing surgeons. Using Italian data from Lombardy,
Moscone et al. (2012) ﬁnd that the presence of social interactions across
patients who are in lack of ofﬁcial information to rate hospitals may
mislead patients in choosing lower providers of care.
Three recent studies are from England. Gaynor et al. (2012) investi-
gate the introduction of choice policies in England for patients in need
of a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) using data for 15months before
(January 2004 to March 2005) and 15 months after (January 2007 to
March 2008). They ﬁnd that patients are responsive to quality, and that
the introduction of hospital choice led to a reduction in mortality and to
increased patients' welfare. Themarket for hip replacement is very differ-
ent from that for CABG. The number of hip replacements has increased
over timewhereas CABG demand has fallen.1 Themarket for hip replace-
ment is less concentrated: CABG surgery is highly specialised and
provided by only 30 hospitals. Hip replacements are performed in most
hospitals in England and the market has grown substantially over time
from 187 providers in 2002/3 to 297 in 2012/13 as a result of the entry
of private providers. Themortality risks of the two procedures also differ:
30-day mortality after non-emergency CABG is 1.17%, compared with
non-emergency hip replacement mortality of 0.35%.1 Hip replacements increased by 30% over our period comparedwith a reduction of 20%
in CABG.Beckert et al. (2012) use English data for elective hip replacement for
2009/10 and measure hospital quality by overall hospital mortality,
MRSA infection rates, hip replacement waiting times and numbers of
doctors and nurses. In keeping with the broader literature on hospital
choice, they ﬁnd that patients are responsive to quality. By contrast
we use condition speciﬁc clinical quality measures (post-operative
emergency readmissions, revision rates, andmortality rates). Moreover,
we investigate how demand responsiveness has changed over a
ten-year period before and after relaxation of constraints on choice.
Gutacker et al. (2015) analyse choice of provider for elective hip
replacement surgery in the English NHS between 2009 and 2013
making use of newly available data on patient reported outcomes
(PROMs) and ﬁnd that using PROMs in addition to conventional quality
measures such as revision and readmission rates improves predictions
of hospital choice. Since PROMs data are only available from April
2009, we use the conventional measures to examine choices before
and after relaxation of constraints on choice.
The literature on rural and urban hospitals is mainly US focused
and hasmostly investigated differences in quality of urban/rural hospitals
(Adams et al., 1991; Goody, 1993; Ferrier and Valdmanis, 1996; Baldwin
et al., 2004). Differences in choice of healthcare provider and targeting
of rural patients have been investigated by Tai et al. (2004) and Roh
et al. (2008). These studies focus on the effect of patients' characteristics
(e.g. age, comorbidities, pastmedical utilisation) and organization charac-
teristics (e.g. volume, type of hospitals, number of beds, ownership sta-
tus) on demand for rural hospitals. Conversely, we focus on differences
in choices (and preferences) between urban and rural patients.
2.2. Institutional background
The England NHS is funded by taxation and free to patients at point
of use. Local purchasing bodies receive budgets from the Department
of Health to contract healthcare provision for their resident populations
from primary care and hospital providers.2 As part of the re-
introduction of the internal market (Dixon et al., 2011), prospective pay-
ment for hospitalswas rolled out incrementally fromApril 2003onwards,
so that increasingly money followed the patient (Farrar et al., 2009). Pre-
viously, health authorities negotiated block contractswith their local pro-
viders under which the provider agreed to treat ﬁxed number of patients
in return for a ﬁxed sum, with some adjustment to the payment if the
number treated differed from the contracted number. Choicewas not en-
tirely constrained. In principle GPs could refer patients to other providers
whowould then be remuneratedper patient but thiswas not encouraged
by health authorities. In 2002/3 the average practice referred patients to
over 7 different providers over all types of elective care (Dusheiko et al.,
2008). Private independent sector providers (ISPs) were allowed to
enter the NHS market for planned care from 2003 onwards; until then
only public NHS hospitals could provide inpatient care.3
In 2006, patients were given the right to choose from at least 4
providers of non-emergency care; and from 2008 they could choose
any qualiﬁed provider wherever located. An electronic booking system
(Choose and Book) was introduced in 2005/6 to allow direct booking
of referrals from general practices. By 2012/13, 50% of all referrals
were made via the system (Dusheiko and Gravelle, 2015). Since 2007
the NHS Choices website has provided public information on the
location, services and quality of providers.
3. Data
We use individual level data from Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES) on all elective admissions for NHS-funded elective primary2013, after which they have been replaced by Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).
3 By 2010/11, private providers treated 4% of NHS elective patients, concentrating on a
small number of high volume procedures such as hip replacements (Hawkes, 2012).
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March 2013 in English NHS and privately-operated hospitals for pa-
tients aged 18 and over.4 We exclude privately-funded patients
treated in NHS hospitals (13,087, or 2.21% of the HES initial sample).
We drop hospitals with less than 50 elective hip replacement pa-
tients in a given year to reduce noise in our quality measures. The av-
erage hospital volume in our estimation sample is 307 patients.
Patient usual place of residence is reported at Lower Super Output
Area (LSOA).5 Each LSOA contains approximately 1500 inhabitants
and is designed to be homogeneous with respect to tenure and accom-
modation type. We use ONS deﬁnitions of urban and rural LSOAs to
attach an indicator of rurality to patients.6 We also attach a measure of
incomedeprivation to each patient by their LSOA using the 2004 Indices
of Multiple Deprivation.
We compute straight-line distances using geographical coordinates
of the centroid of patients' LSOA of residence and the locations of all
hospitals providing hip replacement surgery in a given year.7 The choice
set for each patient is deﬁned as the 30 providers closest to the centroid
of the patient's LSOA of residence. We exclude 5589 NHS-funded
patients (0.96%) who choose a provider outside this choice set.
Wemeasure hospital qualitywith three clinical indicators speciﬁc to
elective hip replacement patients: 28-day emergency readmissions
following discharge; one-year revisions rates following surgery; and
mortality rates within 28 days of discharge. All rates are adjusted for
case-mix differences using the approach prescribed by the Health and
Social Care Information Centre (2013). Emergency readmissions rates
are associated with lower quality of care (Weissman et al., 1999)
and are commonly used as measure of quality, both internationally
(Ashton et al., 1997; Balla et al., 2008) and in England (Billings et al.,
2012; Blunt et al., 2014).
Waiting times are likely to inﬂuence patients' choice of hospital
(Varkevisser and van der Geest, 2007; Sivey, 2012; Gaynor et al.,
2012; Ruwaard and Douven, 2014) since they postpone beneﬁts and
patients' health status may deteriorate while waiting (Appleby et al.,
2005; Oudhoff et al., 2007). We therefore also measure mean waiting
time for hip replacement at a provider as the average time elapsed
from the date the specialist adds a patient to the waiting list to the
date of hospital admission for surgery.
We distinguish between NHS and independent sector (i.e. private)
providers (ISPs) and also group NHS providers into ﬁve categories used
by the National Patient Safety Agency: NHS small and multi-service,
medium, large non-teaching trust, NHS teaching trust, and NHS
specialised orthopaedic provider. This allows for the possibility that
choice of provider may be inﬂuenced by unobservable characteristics
associated with provider type.84 We exclude patients undergoing a revision surgery because these patients are expect-
ed to be more likely to return to the hospital of initial hip replacement surgery, indepen-
dently of observed hospital quality. We use the hip replacement procedure codes from
Department of Health (2008).
5 As our sample span from 2002 to early 2013, we use LSOA deﬁned according to 2001
census boundaries by the English Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS). There were 32,482
LSOA in England according to this deﬁnition.
6 The rural category encompasses the grouping of areas classiﬁed as town and fringe,
village, hamlet and isolateddwellings,while theurban category consist just of urban areas.
See ONS (2004) for details.
7 Hospital location is based on the postcode of the headquarters of NHS trusts and the
postcode of the hospital site for independent sector providers (ISPs).We use NHS hospital
headquarters instead of the hospital site since: NHS produced quality information is de-
ﬁned andmeasured at trust level, NHS sites belonging to the same trust are typically clus-
tered together and over 91% of elective hip replacement operations in NHS providers are
performed in a single site. Private providers are often part of hospital chains which have
more geographically scattered sites, so that LSOA to site distance is more appropriate for
private providers.
8 Note that the size classiﬁcation of NHS providers is not affected by the number of hip
replacement patients as it is based on the total number of all patients (emergency and
elective) and availability of services, and does not vary over time.4. Methods
4.1. Model speciﬁcation
The empirical analysis is based on the conditional logit random util-
ity model (McFadden, 1974). Utility of patient i=1, . . . ,N receiving
care at provider j=1, . . . , J at time t=1, . . . ,T is
Uijt ¼ Vijt þ ξjt þ εijt ð1Þ
where Vijt depends on observed hospital characteristics, such as quality,
and travel distance, ξjt is utility from unobserved hospital characteristics
and εijt is the unobserved random error term. Each patient i has a choice
setMit∈ J. If the error term εijt is distributed as an i.i.d. extreme value, the
probability of patient i choosing hospital j, given that they have decided
to have a hip replacement in the NHS, is
Pijt ¼ exp Vijt þ ξjt
  X
j0∈Mit
exp Vi j0t þ ξ j0t
 24
3
5
−1
ð2Þ
The estimated coefﬁcients in a conditional logit model are identiﬁed
only up to a common scale parameter that depends on the unobserved
variance of the random error term εijt (Train, 2003). To be able to com-
pare marginal utilities of quality and distance across different years, we
estimate a pooled model for all patients across all years interacting
observable hospital characteristics and distance with year dummies.9
We assume that utility of patient i in year twho chooses hospital j of
type g is
Uijt ¼
XK
k
αqktqgkt þ
XK
k
βqktqjkt þ
XS
s
δstd
s
ijt þ
XK
k
XN
i
βq~xkmtqjkt~ximt
þ
XM
m
XS
s
δds
~x
dsijt~ximt þ εijt ¼ qgt
0 αqt þ q0jtβqt þ d0tβdt
þ qjt⊗~xit
 βq~xt þ dt⊗~xitð Þβd~xt þ εijt ð3Þ
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
qjkt is the kth quality measure (emergency readmissions, revisions,
mortality, waiting times) in provider j in year t. qgkt ¼∑Ngtj∈gqjkt=Ngt is
the mean of the kth quality characteristic in hospitals of type g in year
t.10 We include qgkt in the speciﬁcation to allow for the unobserved
provider effects ξjt.11
dijt
s is the s'th power of the distance dijt from the centroid of the
LSOA of residence of patient i to provider j in year t. We found that
a cubic distance speciﬁcation had better ﬁt than linear or quadratic
speciﬁcations but adding further powers of distance did not yield
further improvements.9 Interacting year indicators with hospital quality and waiting times ensures that esti-
matedmarginal utilities and elasticities in a given year are driven only by thehospitalmet-
rics in that same year and are not confounded by variation in other years.
10 There are six hospital types: private, large NHS,mediumNHS, small/multiserviceNHS,
teaching NHS, specialist NHS, with the reference category being large (non-teaching) NHS
hospitals.
11 The model in Eq. (3) is analogous to Mundlak (1978) correction to control for unob-
served heterogeneity. In our sample,we have an unbalanced panel of hospitals of different
types. This might lead to estimation bias due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
caused by differences in quality across hospital types, as well as time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity due to the entry and exit of hospitals of different types. Private hospitals en-
tered themarket after 2006 and are characterizedby a less complex patients' case-mix and
by lowerwaiting times thanNHS hospitals. Similarly, specialist NHS orthopaedic hospitals
have a more complex case-mix than non-specialist ones. The inclusion of qgkt , the quality
characteristic in hospitals of type g in year t, allows us to control for both the unobserved
heterogeneity due to the unobserved differences in hospital types across the years and the
possible sample selection bias of the estimates of quality and waiting times due to the un-
balanced structure of the panel.We also considered richer speciﬁcationswith interactions
of provider type with year dummies to allow the effect of hospital type to vary over time.
However it was not possible to compute coefﬁcients or standard errors for these interac-
tion terms.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics 2002/3–2012/13.
Patient characteristics Mean SD Min Max
Age 67.95 11.36 18 103
Male 0.40 0.49 0 1
Emergency admissions in year prior to admission 0.13 0.56 0 211
Number of Elixhauser comorbitidies 0.32 0.8 0 13
IMD income 2004 (score) 0.13 0.1 0 0.96
Resident in urban LSOA 0.73 0.44 0 1
Availability of hospitals
Average number of hospitals within 10 km 1.37 1.75 0 15
Average number of hospitals within 30 km 7.35 7.23 0 33
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tic (the mean for age, measures of severity and deprivation and the
mode for gender) over all patients in all years and ~ximt ¼ ximt−xm .
We thus allow for patient characteristics to affect themarginal utility
of provider quality and distance. By interacting the deviations of
patient characteristics from their averages we can interpret the
coefﬁcients βktq , βstd as the marginal utilities with respect to
quality and powers of distance of a reference patient with average
characteristics in a given year.
Information on hospital quality indicators is typically available to
patients with a time lag of approximately one year, so patients are
assumed to respond to past rather than current information on quality
when choosing providers. For this reason, provider qualities qjkt
and provider type qualities qgkt (emergency readmissions, revisions,
mortality, and waiting times) are measured with a one-year lag.12
To investigate differences in preferences between urban and rural
patients and how these have evolved over time we also estimate a
model assuming that
Uijt ¼ q0gtαqt þ q0jtβqt þ d0tβdt þ qjt⊗~xit
 βq~xt þ dt⊗~xitð Þβd~xt
þ qjtRijt
 0βqRt þ dtRijt 0βdRt þ εijt ð4Þ
where Ri is an indicator function equal to 1 when the patient resides
in an LSOA classiﬁed as rural. Thus the marginal utilities of quality
and distance for rural patients with reference personal characteristics
are βktq +βktqR and βstd +βstdR.
4.2. Willingness to travel and demand elasticity
Since the utility function (1) is unique only up to a linear transforma-
tion, estimated coefﬁcients convey information only about the sign of
marginal utility and of the effect of quality on demand. However, the
ratio of estimated marginal utilities (i.e. the negative of the marginal
rate of substitution) is unaffected by linear transformations and hence
provides quantitative information about patient preferences which is
comparable across different years and different types of patient.
From Eq. (3) willingness to travel (WTT) of the representative pa-
tient in year t for a one standard deviation increase in the k'th quality
measure (σk) is
WTTkt ¼ σk
∂dijt
∂qjkt

Uijt
¼ σk −
∂Uijt=∂qjkt
∂Uijt=∂dijt
 !
¼ σk
−βqkt
βd1t þ 2βd2tμd þ 3βd3tμ2d
ð5Þ
where μd is the average distance to the chosen provider for all patients
over all years. The delta method is used to compute theWTTs' standard
errors (Hole, 2007). WTTkt is the change in distance to the chosen
hospital that the average patient in year t requires to offset a one
standard deviation increase in qjkt.
Note that in the usual consumer setting, where utility depends on
goods with positive marginal utility, the marginal rate of substitution
between two goods is negative: it is the amount of one good the individ-
ualwould bewilling to give up in exchange for oneunit of another good.
If the quality measures had positive marginal utility and distance has
negative marginal utility then WTT would be positive: it would be the
extra distance the patient would be willing to travel to a hospital with
higher quality. But if, as seems plausible, the quality measures qjkt12 This approach is similar to Beukers et al. (2014) and Gutacker et al. (2015). Hospitals
may learn by doing so that higher volume providers have higher quality. A study with En-
glish 1997–2002 hip replacement data found that 30-day in-hospitalmortality was higher
in low volume hospitals that treated less than 100 patients per year but found no volume
effect above this threshold (Judge et al., 2006). A more recent study (Varagunam et al.,
2015) using better data on quality reported no relationship between hospital volume
and quality. Using lagged quality data further reduces the risk of simultaneity bias.(emergency readmission rates, revision rates, mortality rates, waiting
times) and distance have negative marginal utility, then WTT would
be negative. It would be the reduction in distance to a provider required
to offset the increase in qjkt.
We also compute provider elasticity of demandwith respect to qjkt and
the percentage demand change from a one standard deviation increase in
own quality. Expected demand at provider j is Yjt ¼∑i∈Cjt Pijt where Cjt is
the set of patients whose choice sets include provider j (j ∈ Mit).
Following Santos et al. (2016), the elasticity of demand of provider j
to its quality qjkt is
EYjtjkt ¼
∂Yjt
∂qjkt
qjkt
Yjt
¼
X
i∈Cjt
βqktPijt 1− Pijt
  qjktX
i∈Cjt
Pijt
ð6Þ
We report the mean of Eq. (6) weighted by predicted provider
demand Yjt.
The percentage change in hospital demand for a σk increase in qkt
(semi-elasticity) is
%ΔYkjt

Δqjkt¼σk
¼ ∂Yjt
∂qjkt
σk
Yjt
 100 ¼ 100

X
i∈Cjt
βqktPijt 1− Pijt
 
σk
  X
i∈Cjt
Pijt
 −1
ð7Þ
We investigate the relationship between semi-elasticities and
market structure by plotting the estimates of %ΔYjtk against the number
of rival providers within a radius of 30 km.
5. Results
5.1. Summary statistics
Table 1 has summary statistics on patient characteristics and their
hospital choices. Patients are elderly (average age 68) and 60% are
female. Around 1/8 have had an emergency admission in the year before
their hip replacement andnearly a third suffer from comorbiditieswhen
admitted. Just over a quarter live in rural LSOAs.
On average patients can choose from over 7 hospitals within 30 km
and over 15within 50 km. The average distance to their chosen hospital
was 13km. Two thirds chose their nearest hospital but one third did not,
travelling an additional 3.5 km to their chosen hospital.
Fig. 1 shows the marked changes in clinical quality and waiting
times over the period. Note that, as we assume that patients
observed quality and waiting time with a one year lag, we show
the lagged values against the years for which they are relevant. ForAverage number of hospitals within 50 km 15.55 11.85 0 51
Choice of hospital
Distance to chosen hospital (km) 13.37 13.51 0 292.36
Proportion of patients bypassing closest hospital 0.34 0.47 0 1
Excess distance travelled over closest hospital 3.54 9.41 0 266.04
Proportion of patients treated in private hospitals 0.07 0.25 0 1
Notes. Number of observations is 546,474.
Fig. 1. Trends in one year lagged clinical quality andwaiting times 2002/3 to 2012/13.Note. We plot one-year lagged values against years. For example the lagged readmission rate plotted
against 2002/3 is the readmission rate for 2001/2 as we assume that choices in year t are based on quality and waiting times in year t− 1.
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year in which choices inﬂuenced by 2001/2 readmission rates were
made. Lagged emergency readmission rates increased between
2002/3 and 2007/8 and then declined. Lagged revision rates fell
from 2006/7 onwards and had halved by 2012/13. Lagged mortality
after hip replacement declined over the period.13 There was a large
decrease in waiting times over the period from nearly 9 months to
under 3 months.
Fig. 2 shows the increasing numbers of patients treated over the
period. The total number increased by 65.5% with a larger increase
(83.8%) for rural than for urban (59.5%). There was a substantial
increase in the number of NHS hip replacement patients treated in
private hospitals from zero in 2002/3 to over 20% in 2012/13.
Fig. 3 plots the trends in choices made by patients. In panel (a) we
see that the rural patients travelled about twice as far to their chosen
provider as urban patients. Despite the increase in the number
of providers, due to the entry of private sector ISPs, the average
distance to the chosen provider was constant over the period. Panel
(b) shows that rural patients were more likely to bypass their
nearest provider than urban patients. The proportion of both rural
and urban patients bypassing their nearest provider increased
steadily and by 20,012/13 was 55% for rural patients and 45% for
urban patients. Panels (c) and (d) show how the proportion of
patients choosing their nth closest provider has changed between
2002/3 and 2012/13.
5.2. Estimation results
Table 2 gives selected coefﬁcients frommodelswhich include a cubic
function of distance and patient characteristics interactedwith distance.
Model 1 only has distance and patient characteristics interacted with13 Mortality after elective hip replacement is a rare event. The average standardized 28-
day mortality rate is particularly low in the later years of our sample. The estimation re-
sults presented below are robust to the exclusion of hospital standardized 28-daymortal-
ity rate. Results are available upon request.distance. Model 2 is speciﬁcation (3) which adds quality variables and
patient characteristics interacted with quality to model 1. Model 3 is
speciﬁcation (4) which adds further interactions with patient rurality.
Although most of the explanatory power is due to distance, the pseudo
R2 increases as quality and waiting time are added to the model and
there are considerable improvements in the two information criteria
goodness of ﬁt measures.
5.3. Marginal utility and willingness to travel
Unsurprisingly themarginal utility of distance is negative but less so
as distance increases. Fig. 4 plots marginal utility of distance against
distance (β1td +2β2td μd+3β3td μd2) for 2004/5 and 2008/9 for all patients,
urban patients and rural patients where μd is the mean distance to the
chosen provider for the relevant patient type over all years. Fig. 5 has
the estimated marginal utilities of distance in each year for all patients,
urban patients and rural patients.
The coefﬁcients on distance and quality measures are for the
representative patient with average characteristics.14 Fig. 5 plots
these coefﬁcients of the marginal utilities of distance for different
years and shows that rural patients have a smaller marginal disutility
of distance than urban patients and that marginal disutility did not
change greatly over the period.
Fig. 6 shows the estimated marginal rates of substitution (5) be-
tween distance and the quality measures (WTT). Given the temporal
stability of the marginal utilities of distance, variations over time in
WTT are mainly due to changes in the marginal utilities of quality and
waiting times. The plotted WTT are the change (reduction) in distance
required to compensate for a one standard deviation in increase in
emergency readmission rates, revision rates, mortality rates, and14 The interactions of quality and distancewith patient characteristics are not the key fo-
cus of this analysis and are therefore not reported. They show that older and sicker pa-
tients have more negative marginal utility from distance, and distance has less negative
marginal utility for more deprived patients. Moreover, gender had little effect on prefer-
ences for quality and, more surprisingly, nor does morbidity.
Fig. 2. Trends in patients treated by urbanicity and hospital ownership.
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zero marginal utility up to 2006 but had an increasingly negative
marginal utility thereafter, the emergency readmissions rate WTT was
initially around zero but increased from 2007/8 onwards. The mortality
rate WTT grew up to 2008/9 and then decreased. Up to 2004/5 waiting
times had a small negative marginal disutility. From 2005/6 to 2007/8
patients became more likely to choose hospitals with longer waiting
times, and thereafter they were less likely to choose hospitals with
longer waits. There was no consistent trend in the estimated marginalFig. 3. Distance and choice of prutilities and hence WTT for revision rates. Instead, they do not seem
to consistently respond to one-year revision rates.
The results suggest the effect of readmission rates, mortality,
and waiting times changed after the relaxation of constraints on
patient choice in 2006 and 2008. From 2008 patients were willing
to travel 0.5 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one
standard deviation in emergency readmissions and 0.25 additional
kilometres to avoid an increase of one standard deviation in
waiting times.ovider 2002/3 to 2012/13.
Table 2
Estimates of marginal utilities.
(1) Distance (2) Distance & quality (3) Distance, quality, rurality
Urban patients Rural interactions
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Distance (baseline) −0.351 −92.048 −0.3675 −92.144 −0.3842 −94.01 0.088 14.19
2003 * distance 0.0697 15.718 0.0786 17.005 0.0755 15.522 −0.0229 −3.149
2004 * distance 0.0256 5.084 0.0279 5.298 0.0334 6.164 −0.02 −2.524
2005 * distance 0.0307 6.416 0.0365 7.33 0.0097 1.762 0.0487 6
2006 * distance 0.0232 4.712 0.0339 6.671 0.0419 8.109 −0.0204 −2.743
2007 * distance 0.0417 8.467 0.0467 9.091 0.0428 7.957 0.0115 1.387
2008 * distance 0.0641 13.617 0.0714 14.617 0.0668 12.819 −0.0012 −0.152
2009 * distance 0.0609 12.886 0.0694 14.148 0.0681 13.484 −0.0162 −2.185
2010 * distance 0.0688 14.708 0.0771 15.842 0.0697 13.594 0.0036 0.46
2011 * distance 0.0742 16.31 0.0841 17.79 0.0729 14.318 0.0045 0.592
2012 * distance 0.0706 15.453 0.0806 16.943 0.0775 15.432 −0.0103 −1.343
Readmissions (baseline) 0.0502 10.487 0.0468 8.849 0.0127 1.498
2003 * readmissions −0.063 −8.968 −0.0831 −10.677 0.0655 5.267
2004 * readmissions −0.0425 −5.852 −0.0502 −6.226 0.0115 0.91
2005 * readmissions −0.0519 −8.103 −0.0453 −6.396 −0.0217 −1.879
2006 * readmissions −0.0363 −5.472 −0.0328 −4.45 −0.0173 −1.482
2007 * readmissions −0.0962 −15.237 −0.1137 −16.16 0.056 5.047
2008 * readmissions −0.0709 −11.731 −0.0705 −10.471 −0.0042 −0.388
2009 * readmissions −0.0761 −12.154 −0.0868 −12.473 0.0296 2.686
2010 * readmissions −0.125 −19.998 −0.1211 −17.443 −0.0196 −1.765
2011 * readmissions −0.1185 −19.507 −0.1316 −19.436 0.0403 3.78
2012 * readmissions −0.107 −17.742 −0.1089 −16.258 0.0046 0.438
Waiting times (baseline) 0.0014 0.266 −0.0112 −1.943 0.0592 6.278
2003 * waiting times −0.0145 −2.027 −0.0153 −1.983 0.0019 0.148
2004 * waiting times −0.0086 −1.027 −0.0143 −1.586 0.0183 1.201
2005 * waiting times 0.0626 6.595 0.0564 5.424 0.0222 1.327
2006 * waiting times 0.1172 10.837 0.1152 9.683 0.0057 0.302
2007 * waiting times 0.0632 5.411 0.0572 4.348 0.0131 0.658
2008 * waiting times −0.046 −4.757 −0.0369 −3.364 −0.0462 −2.841
2009 * waiting times −0.0177 −1.341 −0.0234 −1.56 0.0079 0.359
2010 * waiting times 0.002 0.206 0.0284 2.63 −0.1058 −6.384
2011 * waiting times −0.0522 −4.013 −0.0319 −2.214 −0.0842 −3.692
2012 * waiting times −0.0239 −2.122 −0.0105 −0.84 −0.0567 −2.857
Revisions (baseline) −0.0817 −6.628 −0.0797 −6.021 −0.043 −1.877
2003 * revisions 0.1732 10.776 0.155 8.929 0.0825 2.735
2004 * revisions 0.0143 0.964 −0.0196 −1.226 0.186 6.627
2005 * revisions 0.0707 4.704 0.0514 3.142 0.1113 4.002
2006 * revisions 0.084 5.624 0.0581 3.604 0.1288 4.556
2007 * revisions 0.1288 7.825 0.117 6.523 0.0837 2.795
2008 * revisions 0.0233 1.485 −0.007 −0.411 0.1311 4.55
2009 * revisions 0.0544 3.156 −0.0041 −0.215 0.2373 7.556
2010 * revisions 0.027 1.55 0.0002 0.01 0.1498 4.66
2011 * revisions 0.1412 9.065 0.1389 8.166 0.0508 1.791
2012 * revisions 0.0982 6.178 0.0802 4.618 0.1004 3.478
Mortality (baseline) −0.1335 −5.186 −0.1096 −3.912 −0.1079 −2.311
2003 * deaths 0.02 0.593 0.0517 1.414 −0.1524 −2.423
2004 * deaths −0.0176 −0.519 −0.0472 −1.277 0.1429 2.278
2005 * deaths −0.1901 −5.2 −0.2264 −5.661 0.1137 1.705
2006 * deaths −0.077 −2.155 −0.2445 −6.183 0.6332 9.896
2007 * deaths −0.1876 −5.13 −0.1808 −4.508 0.0013 0.02
2008 * deaths −0.2923 −7.272 −0.3122 −7.1 0.1195 1.6
2009 * deaths −0.0085 −0.223 −0.0525 −1.245 0.173 2.527
2010 * deaths 0.2848 7.745 0.2555 6.298 0.1203 1.8
2011 * deaths 0.0705 1.688 0.1117 2.438 −0.1506 −1.981
2012 * deaths −0.0098 −0.207 0.157 2.963 −0.491 −5.925
Pseudo R^2 0.6583 0.6746 0.6759
AIC 1,270,578 1,210,694 1,205,984
BIC 1,273,471 1,218,088 1,214,503
Notes. All models also contain distance squared, distance cubed, interactions of patient characteristics with distance, distance squared, distance cubed, all interacted with year. Models 2
and 3 also contain average quality of provider type and interactions of patient characteristics with quality, all interacted with year.
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The WTT for urban and rural patients are shown in Fig. 7. Rural
patients have a smaller marginal disutility from distance than
urban patients. The marginal disutility for mortality is similar for
urban and rural patients in most years up to 2011/12 except for
2006/7. Up to 2008/9 rural patients had a positive marginal utilityfor waiting time. Urban patients dislike 1-year revisions in most
years while this is not the case for rural patients. Urban patients
dislike emergency readmissions more than rural patients in most of
the recent years.
There are no systematic differences in the WTT for waiting times
after 2008/9. There are also no systematic differences in WTT to avoid
higher mortality except for the more recent years. In the last year
Fig. 4.Marginal utilities of distance in 2004/5 and 2008/9.Note. Marginal utility of distance is β1td +2β2td μd+3β3td μd2 where μd is themean distance to chosen provider for each patient type
over all years and the coefﬁcients on the powers of distance are for the representative patientwith average personal characteristics. Coefﬁcients for all patients are frommodel (2) and for
rural and urban patients from model (3). Vertical lines show the average distance to the chosen provider for: all patients (solid); urban (short dashed); rural (long dashed).
119G. Moscelli et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 60 (2016) 112–124(2012/13) rural patients are willing to travel 1 km more than urban
patients to avoid a one standard deviation increase in elective hip re-
placement mortality rates. Despite the higher disutility from travelling,
urban patients are willing to travel further (up to 1 km in 2009) than
rural ones to avoid increases in revisions after surgery. There are similar
differences in all the years, except for 2002/3.Fig. 5. Trends inmarginal utility of distance. Note. Marginal utility of distance is β1td +2β2td μd+3
and the coefﬁcients on the powers of distance are for the representative patient with average
urban patients from model (3).The marginal utility for readmission rates was positive for rural
patients in the pre-choice years before 2005. Similarly, the marginal
utility for waiting times was positive for rural patients before 2007. It
is unlikely that patients prefer high emergency readmissions or long
waits. We interpret these counterintuitive results as evidence that
hospital choice was constrained, i.e. patients were effectively allocatedβ3td μd2 where μd is themean distance to chosen provider for each patient type over all years
personal characteristics. Coefﬁcients for all patients are from model (2) and for rural and
Fig. 6.Willingness to travel (WTT) for one standard deviation increase in quality and waiting time.
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constraints to hospital choice.5.5. Hospitals' demand elasticity to quality
Table 3 reports the elasticity of demand with respect to own quality
(6) for each year averaged across all hospitals. Although demand
responds to quality after the introductionof choice policy, itwas relatively
inelastic. In years after 2008 the mean demand elasticity with respect toFig. 7.Willingness to travel for a standard deviationemergency readmissions is−0.17 and with respect to waiting time it
is −0.04. Demand also responds to mortality rates, though less so in
later years, and across the whole period the demand elasticity is−0.03.5.6. Semi-elasticities and number of rival hospitals
Fig. 7 plots the percentage change in demand for each hospital
resulting from 1 SD increases in readmission, mortality and revision
rates, and waiting times (semi-elasticity (7)) against the number ofincreases in quality for urban and rural patients.
Table 3
Average hospital demand elasticities with respect to own quality by year.
Year Readmissions Mean waiting time Revisions Mortality
2002 0.124 0.005 −0.06 −0.027
2003 −0.037 −0.051 0.077 −0.026
2004 0.022 −0.023 −0.067 −0.033
2005 −0.005 0.179 −0.01 −0.06
2006 0.044 0.295 0.002 −0.043
2007 −0.156 0.148 0.035 −0.043
2008 −0.066 −0.086 −0.039 −0.057
2009 −0.082 −0.023 −0.016 −0.017
2010 −0.254 0.005 −0.029 0.02
2011 −0.23 −0.078 0.034 −0.005
2012 −0.201 −0.038 0.009 −0.009
Note. Elasticities are computed from model (2).
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extent to which hospitals facing more competitors have a more elastic
demand. We compare two years, 2004/5 and 2008/09, before and
after relaxation of constraints on choice.
Fig. 8(a) shows that in 2004/5 semi-elasticities with respect to
emergency readmissions were positive (on average equal to 0.8%).
The correlation between semi-elasticity of demand and number
of rival hospitals was positive and signiﬁcant (at 5%). In contrast, in
2008/9 the semi-elasticities with respect to emergency readmissions
were negative (on average equal to−2.5%, varying between−0.35%
and −4.8%) and negatively correlated with the number of rival
hospitals. This suggests that after the introduction of choice, hospital
demand responded to quality and the percentage demand change was
larger for hospitals facing more potential competitors. The effect of
additional rivals seems modest. In 2008/9, a hospital with 5 rivals had
a predicted semi-elasticity of −2%, whereas a hospital with twice as
many rivals (10 rivals) has a predicted semi-elasticity of−2.44%.
Fig. 8(b) shows that in 2004/5 semi-elasticities with respect to
waiting times are negative but small (on average − 0.87%). In
2008/9, the semi-elasticities with respect to waiting times areFig. 8. Percentage demand change from a standard devigreater absolutely (on average equal to −6%, and varying between
−0.84% and −11.4%), and negatively correlated with the number
of rivals hospitals. In 2008/9 one additional rival increases absolutely
the semi-elasticity of demand by almost a ﬁfth.
The patterns of semi-elasticities with respect to mortality in
Fig. 8(d) are qualitatively similar to those for waiting times. In 2004/5
they are negative but small. In 2008/9, the semi-elasticities with respect
to mortality vary between−1.18% and−16% and additional rivals lead
to a bigger change in the semi-elasticity. The semi-elasticities with
respect to revisions are negatively associated with the number of rivals
(Fig. 8(c)) but with a similar pattern in 2004/5 and 2008/9 (full results
are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix).
6. Conclusions
We have investigated changes in the responsiveness of demand to
quality following the introduction of the new internal market from
2002/3 onwards and in particular the relaxation of constraints on pa-
tient choice from 2006 onwards. Consistently with previous literature
we ﬁnd that distance is the main predictor of hospital choice. Before
2006 demand was sometimes higher for providers with worse quality
or longer waiting times – a ﬁnding we interpret as suggesting that pa-
tient choices were indeed constrained. After 2006 these patterns disap-
pear and we ﬁnd that patients preferred, on average, providers with
lowerwaiting times, emergency readmissions rates, andmortality rates.
Although hospitals with higher quality, ceteris paribus, attract more
patients, the estimated demand elasticities are generally 0.2 or less.
With an average NHS tariff for hip replacement in 2012/13 of £5866
this implies that, for example, a reduction in the emergency readmission
rate of one standard deviationwould increase the number of hip replace-
ment patients in an average provide by 24.4, yielding a revenue increase
£143,000. However, additional patients impose additional costs and
increasing quality by one standard deviation will also be costly.
Hospital demand is more responsive to quality for providers facing
more rivals. Although the result is intuitive, the increase in responsiveness
seems quite small. For example in 2012/13, hospitals with ten additionalation increase in own quality and number of rivals.
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which are more negative by−1.2%.
Compared with urban patients, rural patients do not seem to have
very different preferences with respect to quality, except for revision
rates (and readmission rates in recent years), which are generally found
to be disliked more by urban than by rural patients. In contrast, rural pa-
tients are less averse to distances and travel further to their chosen
provider. Although marginal disutility from travel is lower, the total dis-
utility of travel is higher for rural patients. There seems to be scope for
choice policies to be further reﬁned and to stimulate patients to choose
providers based on quality. Surveys of patients suggest that only around
2/3 are aware of their right to a choice and that around 50% report
being offered a choice (Dixon, 2010). There may be required policies
which encourage further dissemination anduse of information onquality.
Other possibilities include subsidising travel expenses for patients
bypassing local hospitals, as in Norway (Askildsen et al., 2013). The cost
of interventions aimed at further stimulating competition need however
to be traded-off with the opportunity cost of introducing alternative
policies aimed at improving quality, such as monitoring and auditing,
and pay-for-performance schemes. Our study compares demandR
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Mresponsiveness to quality before and after the introduction of choice pol-
icies. One possible limitation is that some of these changes are due also to
changes in patients' preferences over time and technological progress, as
evidenced by improved health outcomes.Acknowledgements
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Table A1
Linear regression of hospital semi-elasticities estimates (from Eq. (7)) on number of rival hospitals within 30 km.Quality measure Year OLS coefﬁcient 95% C.I. boundseadmissions 2002 0.2394 [0.2209, 0.2578]
eadmissions 2003 −0.0609 [−0.0657,−0.0560]
eadmissions 2004 0.0338 [0.0302, 0.0373]
eadmissions 2005 −0.0075 [−0.0083,−0.0067]
eadmissions 2006 0.0625 [0.0569, 0.0681]
eadmissions 2007 −0.1883 [−0.2057,−0.1709]
eadmissions 2008 −0.0869 [−0.0936,−0.0802]
eadmissions 2009 −0.0864 [−0.0962,−0.0765]
eadmissions 2010 −0.2087 [−0.2335,−0.1838]
eadmissions 2011 −0.1424 [−0.1658,−0.1190]
eadmissions 2012 −0.1228 [−0.1461,−0.0995]
aiting times 2002 0.0075 [0.0069, 0.0081]
aiting times 2003 −0.0687 [−0.0742,−0.0632]
aiting times 2004 −0.0349 [−0.0386,−0.0313]
aiting times 2005 0.3083 [0.2755, 0.3411]
aiting times 2006 0.5947 [0.5415, 0.6479]
aiting times 2007 0.2934 [0.2663, 0.3205]
aiting times 2008 −0.2072 [−0.2231,−0.1912]
aiting times 2009 −0.0601 [−0.0670,−0.0533]
aiting times 2010 0.0107 [0.0094, 0.0120]
aiting times 2011 −0.1174 [−0.1368,−0.0981]
aiting times 2012 −0.0540 [−0.0642,−0.0437]
evisions 2002 −0.1705 [−0.1837,−0.1573]
evisions 2003 0.1896 [0.1745, 0.2047]
evisions 2004 −0.1295 [−0.1432,−0.1159]
evisions 2005 −0.0207 [−0.0229,−0.0185]
evisions 2006 0.0046 [0.0042, 0.0051]
evisions 2007 0.0844 [0.0766, 0.0922]
evisions 2008 −0.1069 [−0.1152,−0.0987]
evisions 2009 −0.0397 [−0.0443,−0.0352]
evisions 2010 −0.0667 [−0.0747,−0.0588]
evisions 2011 0.0543 [0.0453, 0.0632]
evisions 2012 0.0156 [0.0127, 0.0186]
ortality 2002 −0.1041 [−0.1121,−0.0960]
ortality 2003 −0.0878 [−0.0948,−0.0808]
ortality 2004 −0.1085 [−0.1199,−0.0971]
ortality 2005 −0.2293 [−0.2537,−0.2049]
ortality 2006 −0.1553 [−0.1692,−0.1414]
ortality 2007 −0.2146 [−0.2345,−0.1948]
ortality 2008 −0.2914 [−0.3138,−0.2689]
ortality 2009 −0.0773 [−0.0861,−0.0685]
ortality 2010 0.0690 [0.0608, 0.0772]
ortality 2011 −0.0214 [−0.0250,−0.0179]
ortality 2012 −0.0506 [−0.0602,−0.0410]M
Fig. A2.Marginal utilities of quality, waiting time and distance for urban and rural patients.
Fig. A1.Marginal utilities of quality, waiting time and distance.
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